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Abstract: The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather 
than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these 
forms of economic organisation. In construction the “make or buy” decision invariably leads 
to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) 
raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of 
contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests 
that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract 
this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and 
quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least 
risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the 
impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and 
the decision to outsource.  
Keywords: bid evaluation, contractor selection, pre-qualification, transaction costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Production can be organised administratively within firms as well as contractually between 
them. Having selected an end product line, a producer must decide which products and 
services will be undertaken and administered within the organisation and which products or 
services will be outsourced.  
Economic analyses have often implicitly assumed that the costs of economic organisation are 
zero, when, in fact, they are not (Klein et al. 1978). Transaction cost theory holds that the 
relative costs associated with different forms of economic organisation are a major factor in 
the decision to outsource.  Coase (1937), with his pioneering theory of the firm, holds that if 
the costs of in-house production exceed those of contracting out the work, the firm will opt 
for outsourcing.  The structure of a firm is regarded as the result of a competition between the 
price of internal resources and the market price. 
Construction work is almost invariably outsourced.  If Coase’s theory is valid, this may be 
attributed to the fact that the market price is less than the cost of using internal resources to 
complete a project.  Outsourcing requires that the process of contractor selection take place 
and that a contract be formed between the buyer and the producer or service provider.  In 
construction, commonplace contractual relationships include those between client and 
designer, client and builder, and builder and subcontractor.  
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The contractor selection decision is crucial to ensuring that costs incurred in entering a 
contract are minimised. It is with this in mind that the following review endeavours to: 
 explore the contractor selection process in the wider context of economic organisation 
theory; 
 identify different contractor selection models; 
 discuss the likely impact of contractor selection methods on transaction costs; and 
 develop a framework for future research in contractor selection. 
THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Production arrangements can be represented as a continuum with vertical integration and 
outsourcing as the opposite extremes.  In vertical integration, production processes are 
internalised by the firm. Outsourcing involves selecting, from the market, the firm that will 
render the required services or deliver the specified product.  Between these extremes, there 
are several intermediary organisational arrangements.  Coase suggested that within firms, 
“the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted by the 
entrepreneur-coordinator who directs production.”  The main reason for the establishment of 
firms is that there is a cost to using the price mechanism (Coase 1937).  
TRANSACTION COSTS 
Williamson developed Coase’s theory further to suggest that economic agents primarily seek 
to economise on transaction costs.  Despite repeated reference to transaction costs in his 
works, Williamson failed to provide a satisfactory definition of this term (Hodgeson 1993). 
Dahlman categorises transaction costs as search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs and policing and enforcement costs (Dahlman 1979).  Transaction costs can 
also be categorised as either ex-ante or ex-post. Ex-ante costs include the costs of tendering, 
negotiating and writing the contract while ex-post costs may be incurred during the execution 
and policing of the contract or of resolving disputes arising from the contracted work 
(Williamson 1975). 
Dahlman (1979) argues that all categories of transaction cost represent a lack of information. 
Information is defined elsewhere as a prime source of high transaction costs (Casson 1994, 
Holstrom and Tirole 1989).  According to Casson (1995) vertical integration emerges when 
people with access to decisive information, which others need to use, inform these other 
people of their decisions rather than of the information itself.  The transfer of information 
within a firm rather than between firms is believed to reduce transaction costs (Kay 1982, 
Pass et al. 1995). 
SOURCES OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Williamson (1975, 1985) assumed that: 
• human beings are subject to bounded rationality or an inability to predict events in a 
complex and uncertain future; 
• people are given to opportunism in that they will behave in a self-interested way; and 
• asset specificity, or a specialisation of assets with respect to use or users, exists.  
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The interplay of these three factors gives rise to transaction costs (Coase 1988) and their co-
existence may lead to business failure in general and may ultimately bring about market 
failure (Ascher 1987).  
TRANSACTION COSTS IN CONSTRUCTION 
Winch (1989) identifies four sources of uncertainty in the construction industry. Task 
uncertainty derives from small batch production in which units of one to tens are typical. 
Task uncertainty is inherent in each construction project. New problems emerge, solutions 
must be found and the learning is not always transferable to the next project. Natural 
uncertainty also affects construction work. For example, geotechnical conditions are 
unknown before work commences and inclement weather can cause disruption and delay. 
Organisational uncertainty arises from the fact that construction projects represent temporary 
coalitions between functionally distinct parties. Tensions can arise and there is a period 
within which team members learn to work with one another effectively. Contracting 
uncertainty arises due to errors in estimating. Another source of contracting uncertainty is 
that small changes in tender success rate lead to large changes in turnover because projects 
represent a high proportion of total turnover for firms (Winch 1989). Given the assumption 
that bounded rationality applies, the uncertain nature of construction work should incur high 
transaction costs. 
The other two sources of transaction costs, asset specificity and opportunism, are also evident 
in the construction industry. Asset specificity is not a significant factor prior to a contract 
being let because, except for specialised civil engineering or building services work, a 
client’s ability to switch between alternative contractors is high (Winch 1989). However, 
once a contract has been awarded, a monopolistic situation arises because it becomes very 
difficult and costly for a client to change contractors (Winch 1989). This creates the potential 
for opportunistic behaviour, on the part of contractors, such as the use of changes in project 
specification to extract a high price for ‘extras’ (Winch 1989). 
THE CONSTRUCTION MARKET 
Theoretically, the existence of uncertainty and opportunism in the construction industry 
should increase the cost of market transactions. Despite this, outsourcing is extremely 
prevalent (Alsogoff and McDermott 1994).  Uher and Runeson (1985) reported that over 
90% of Australian construction work is outsourced.  
Winch (1989) suggests that, within the transaction cost economics framework, the 
construction industry in the United Kingdom is a case of market failure. He asserts that the 
high level of market governance of transactions has brought about the situation that 
transaction and production costs exceed the cost of similar transactions being carried out in-
house. He concludes that vertical integration would eliminate the problem of information 
impactedness that exists between parties to a contract. In particular, the designer/main 
contractor and principal contractor/specialist subcontractor interfaces could be more 
economically governed by a hierarchy rather than a market structure. 
Examination of the components of transaction costs arising from the sources of bounded 
rationality, opportunism and asset specificity reveals that much of these costs are ex-post 
costs, incurred after the contract has been awarded. These costs include direct costs such as 
the cost of implementing elaborate surveillance and control systems, using computer-based 
scheduling models and cost accounting, measuring performance, implementing a quality 
assurance system and providing additional of layers of the managerial hierarchy (Reve and 
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Levitt 1984). There are also indirect costs such as the effect on motivation and alienation of 
workers resulting from the visible demonstration of a lack of trust. The extent to which these 
ex-post costs could be reduced by actions taken prior to the award of a contract should be 
investigated. It is possible that careful selection of a contractor may reduce the need for these 
control mechanisms and thus reduce total transaction costs.  
CONTRACTOR SELECTION AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Contractor selection decisions are usually made following pre-selection activities of 
competition or negotiation (Smith 1986, Lower 1982). Under a competitive contractor 
selection process, the client will put the works to tender and interested contractors are invited 
to submit bids.  Bidding is pursued either through open or selective tendering.  Open 
tendering allows all interested parties the opportunity to bid for the works. In the selective 
tendering process, contractors are subject to prequalification. Firms are short-listed on the 
basis of this prequalification and only a limited number are then invited to bid (Seeley 1984, 
Willis and Willis 1980). In some circumstances, clients may decide to engage in negotiation 
with prospective contractors rather than competitive bidding. Tendering may be phased with 
a short-list generated after the first stage of competition.  Negotiation may then be initiated 
between one or two firms on the short-list and the client and the final contractor selection 
decision, based upon this negotiation (Kwakye 1994, Mudd 1984).   
Selecting a contractor is an important decision that has a significant bearing on the success 
and cost of a project. There is a difference between lowest initial cost and the most 
competitive price for a client given prevalent market conditions (Holt et al 1995). The 
selection of an adverse contractor can result in unsatisfactory outcomes such as poor quality 
or time overruns. Ultimately these outcomes cost clients financially. For example, in the case 
of construction delays, clients’ invested capital is committed while the potential generation of 
income from the investment is postponed.  
Ex-post transaction costs arising from disputes and litigation can also be high. Annual 
administration costs for construction claims filed against the Texas Department of 
Transportation are estimated to represent 2.8% of total agency payroll and for every $1 paid 
in claims to a contractor, $9 of public money is spent (Crowley and Hancher 1995). Crowley 
and Hancher (1995) argue that to reduce these costs there is a need for objective, effective 
evaluation and selection of contractors. Thus far, the relationship between the method of 
contractor selection and transaction costs has not been investigated. Different models of 
contractor selection are described below and their usefulness in economising on transaction 
costs is discussed. 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
Most construction clients favour competitive tendering (Murdoch and Hughes 1992; Dawood 
1994; Holt et al 1995). Merna and Smith (1990) observe that through competitive tendering, 
contracts are typically awarded to the bidder with the lowest price.  In the public sector, this 
usually happens for reasons of accountability (Rankin et al.  1996, Turner 1979). It is argued 
that using lowest price as yardstick for selecting contractors ensures that the client gets value 
for money through free and fair competition (Trickey 1982, Smith 1986).   
However, lowest contemporaneous price cannot be guaranteed to yield the overall lowest 
project cost after execution (Pearson 1985, Dawood 1994, Pasquire and Collins 1997). In 
construction, contractors commonly implement the practice of adjusting their bid prices in an 
attempt to underbid fellow competitors and win contracts.  Research indicates that this 
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practice produces unrealistically low bids in some open tenders (Kwakye 1994, Herbsman & 
Ellis 1992). Murdoch and Hughes (1992) caution that lowest price syndrome does not 
guarantee best product. Holt et al (1995) cite research evidence to indicate that contracts let 
by open competition are less successful and exhibit greater divergence between final contract 
value and tender value than contracts awarded by other means. 
Uncertainty and bounded rationality are identified as sources of transaction costs. It is likely 
that competitive tendering serves to increase contracting uncertainty arising from estimating 
errors or the deliberate submission of an unrealistically low bid. For example the practice of 
contractors ‘buying work’ to maintain continuity of employment is known to occur. This 
poses a serious risk to clients since there is an increased possibility that the contractor will 
collapse, leaving an unfinished product and requiring that the client engage another 
contractor (Holt et al 1995). The practice of reducing a bid to the value that the contractor 
believes is sufficiently low to win the job also exposes clients to the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour such as post-contractual claims and price overruns (Crowley and Hancher 1995a). 
Such opportunistic behaviour is probably encouraged by the monopolistic situation whereby, 
once a contract has been awarded, it is difficult for a client to remove a contractor and engage 
another. According to transaction cost economic theory, the practice of awarding the contract 
to the lowest bidder should be associated with relatively high transaction costs owing to the 
degree of contracting uncertainty and the prospect of opportunistic behaviour. Use of this 
method of selecting contractors should therefore be considered in the light of its effects on 
the costs of the transaction. 
COMPARATIVE BID EVALUATION MODELS 
Bid evaluation methods of contractor selection commonly involve comparisons of price and 
time factors amongst bids. Gilbreath (1992) recommends the use of a fair price estimate as a 
means of identifying mistakes or malpractices on the part of bidders. This involves the use of 
an internally prepared bid estimate as a benchmark to measuring actual bids during bid 
evaluation. Alternatively, some owners identify a predetermined project cost range and the 
lowest bidder, within this pre-determined price range is then selected (Lewis 1977). 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis is another method for identifying unethical practices at 
the tendering stage (Hardy et al.  1981). The net cash for project execution, as payable to 
bidders, is calculated and reduced to present day value before bids are compared (Selinger 
1983; Vorster 1977; Smith 1979). Some countries, for example Taiwan and Italy, have 
adopted an average-bid method of awarding construction contracts (Ioannou and Leu 1993). 
Crowley and Hancher (1995a) developed a more sophisticated inferential statistical technique 
to identify discordant bids that are not in line with other bids received.  
Comparative bid evaluation techniques may be useful in identifying sources of opportunistic 
behaviour before entering into a contract. Commonly occurring misunderstandings and errors 
can give rise to opportunistic practices such as the pricing of bill items so as to facilitate 
greater cash benefits in the event of variations (Yizhe and Youjie 1992; Teicholz and Ashley 
1978). Bid evaluation techniques could assist in identifying such misunderstandings or errors 
that require clarification or correction. Unethical practices such as front-end loading and 
bidder collusion may also be identified using bid evaluation methods. According to 
transaction cost theory, the identification and elimination of sources opportunistic behaviour 
would serve to reduce the costs of a transaction.  
Comparative bid evaluation techniques are based on the assumption that tendering is a 
rational, predictable process when in fact bidding is unpredictable and characterised by 
uncertainty (Green 1989). Price rates vary according to technological, economic and 
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organisational factors (Crowley and Hancher 1995b) and there is no unique answer as to how 
much each individual job component will cost (Fine 1975). Uncertainties inherent in the 
tendering process will probably not be greatly reduced through the use of comparative bid 
evaluation techniques since these techniques are based on the false assumption that tendering 
behaviour is rational. The effectiveness of the techniques in reducing transaction costs arising 
from uncertainty is therefore likely to be limited. 
Bid evaluation models do not take into account parameters other than tender price. It is likely 
that other factors, such as the contractor’s reputation, previous experience, quality and 
occupational health and safety performance will also give rise to uncertainty and 
opportunistic behaviour and will therefore affect transaction costs. Consideration of a broader 
range of parameters is probably needed if transaction costs are to be economised. 
QUALIFICATION 
Qualification relates to the assessment of contractors’ competence. Qualification may occur 
on a project by project basis or may be an ongoing process in which clients maintain a record 
of contractor performance for future reference.  Prequalification is the practice by which 
owners vet contractors prior to distributing contract documents (Rankin et al, 1996). This 
practice ensures that all contractors who are allowed to bid are competent to carry out the 
works and final contractor selection can focus merely on comparing and evaluating bids 
rather than considering contractor competence. Under the post-qualification model, there is 
no restriction on who may submit a bid but only those tenderers with the lowest bids will be 
subject to qualification or competence assessment (Rankin et al 1996). 
Russell and Jaselskis (1992) found that contractor failure is more likely to occur when an 
owner spends minimal effort evaluating a contractor’s competence to perform the work prior 
to accepting the contractor’s bid.  Furthermore, contractor failure significantly increases the 
final project cost and schedule duration. 
The ex-ante transaction costs borne by a client would be less for post-qualification than for 
prequalification since, in post-qualification, only a few bidders are subject to competency 
assessment while prequalification requires that the competency of all prospective bidders be 
reviewed.  
Several authors or agencies have proposed multi-parameter models for evaluating 
contractors’ competence to meet client objectives. Existing multi-parameter models evaluate 
contractor’s potential performance across a range of different criteria. Emphasis on different 
criteria varies between public and private clients (Russell et al 1992) and some models 
provide for the weighting of parameters according to individual client’s needs (Herbsman and 
Ellis 1992). 
Multi-parameter qualification models may integrate qualitative and quantitative assessment 
of contractors (Russell 1992). Russell proposes the development of a hybrid decision support 
system on the grounds that different modelling techniques are restricted in their capability 
and flexibility. Under Russell’s model, financial stability is assessed through cash flow 
algorithms, ratio analyses, trend analyses, simulations and knowledge-based expert systems 
while technical expertise is assessed using fuzzy set modelling techniques. 
Multi-parameter contractor qualification methods provide a much greater scope for reducing 
ex-post transaction costs than do bid evaluation models in that they have the capacity to 
address a broad range of issue that commonly give rise to opportunistic behaviour and 
uncertainty. Traditional time, cost and quality factors are considered alongside additional 
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factors such as safety, durability, security, human resource management and maintenance 
(National Joint Consultative Committee for Building 1989, CIDA 1993). While the ex-ante 
cost of using multi-parameter qualification methods would be relatively high owing to the 
need to collect and analyse a substantial amount of data for each contractor, these systems 
have the potential to significantly reduce ex-post costs incurred as a result of the transaction. 
For example, selecting a contractor accredited to ISO 9000 would probably reduce the 
requirement for a client to undertake costly quality monitoring activities. 
QUANTITATIVE MODELS 
Quantitative evaluation techniques utilise formulae or computer programmes in multi-
parameter contractor evaluation. Quantitative evaluation models differ from each other with 
respect to the computational algorithms they employ. Approaches adopted include:  
 the use of a multi-dimensional utility model of the contractor selection process 
(Diekmann 1981);  
 the use of cluster analysis to identify the bid representing overall utility optimisation 
(Seydel and Olson 1990); 
 the use of fuzzy set theory to subjectively assess and aggregate the effect of multiple 
criteria (Nguyen 1985); 
 the use of fuzzy set theory to organise knowledge and experience of building 
professionals in the development of a fuzzy expert system for contractor selection (Wong 
and So 1995); 
 the use of a linear hierarchical decision model and computerised system with in-built 
rules based on heuristic knowledge (Russell et al. 1990); 
 the use of an analytical hierarchy process model for carrying out bid evaluation (Mustafa 
and Ryan 1990); and 
 the use of performance ranking using a Likert-type scale followed by additive and 
multiplicative computation of data (Assaf and Jannadi 1994).  
The development of reliable and valid quantitative evaluation methods for multi-parameter 
contractor evaluation could effectively reduce both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. The 
reliance on subjective assessment of performance in some criteria renders the application of 
multi-parameter contractor selection processes unwieldy and difficult to implement. Costs 
associated with training personnel in evaluating performance are high where subjective 
judgements are required. Gathering and evaluating qualitative data may also be time 
consuming compared to the collection and analysis of easily quantified information.  
Ex-post costs could be reduced through quantitative evaluation of contractor performance 
since more objective, consistent and reliable results would be achieved. The likelihood of 
human error or bias would be minimised and contractor selection decisions would be 
defensible to unsuccessful tenderers who may consider challenging contractor selection 
decisions as being ‘arbitrary.’ 
DISCUSSION 
Information impactedness is a source of transaction costs and thus freely available 
information could be expected to reduce transaction costs. However, information is only 
available at a cost. The cost of collecting information before entering into a contractual 
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relationship represents an ex-ante transaction cost. It is theoretically possible to gather perfect 
information on all prospective tenderers for the purpose of making a contractor selection 
decision (Holt et al 1995) but the ex-ante transaction costs associated with the collection of 
such perfect information would be very high. To collect perfect information could be 
expected to minimise bounded rationality and limit the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. 
The minimisation of bounded rationality and opportunism should act to reduce ex-post costs 
of entering into the contract since the contractor engaged would be less likely to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour and the requirements for policing the contract and/or entering into 
costly litigation will be reduced. Thus in a situation of perfect information, ex-ante costs 
would be at a maximum but ex-post costs would be minimised. 
On the other hand, where little information about prospective tenderers is available prior to 
the award of a contract, a client’s bounded rationality could be expected to be high and the 
client would be exposed to a high risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of contractors. 
Ex-ante transaction costs would be low in such circumstances, since little or no cost has been 
incurred in collecting information about prospective tenderers. However, it is likely that ex-
post costs, associated with the need for close monitoring of contractor activities and the 
increased possibility of costly legal disputes and claims, will be high. 
Figure one shows a theoretical model of the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs, information and total transaction costs. Where information about 
prospective contractors obtained prior to contractor selection is low (I1), ex-ante costs are 
also low (A1) but ex-post costs are high (P1). Total transaction costs are identified as being 
the sum of ex-ante and ex-post costs of transactions. In Figure 1, where information obtained 
prior to contractor selection is low, total transaction costs would be the sum of A1 and P1, 






















Figure 1: Theoretical model of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
Where information about prospective contractors obtained prior to the contractor selection 
decision is higher (I2), ex-ante costs incurred in collecting this information will also be high 



















Figure 2: Theoretical model of optimum transaction costs 
prior to the contractor selection is high, total transaction costs would be the sum of A2 and P2, 
represented on the graph by TC2.  
Figure 2 shows that, theoretically, transaction costs may be optimised at the lowest point in 
the total transaction cost curve. The optimum cost of transaction is therefore TCO, which 
related to an information level of IO, an ex-post cost of PO and an ex-ante cost of AO. 
Different models of contractor selection will require that differing amounts of information 
about prospective tenderers be gathered. At one extreme, competitive tendering requires little 
information prior to making the contractor selection decision. Competitive tendering may be 
represented by level I1 in Figure 1. The more complex the contractor selection model, the 
greater the information required prior to selecting a contractor. The multi-attribute and 
quantitative models reviewed may be represented by level I2 in Figure 1. Theoretically, the 
ideal contractor selection model could be said to require an information level of  IO (Figure 2) 
since at this point transaction costs are at their lowest.  
Most of the contractor selection literature has developed theoretical models for making the 
selection decision. Some authors have sought to test these models. Holt et al (1995) rated 
contractors according to their selection model and compared these ratings with past 
performance of contractors using the parameters of cost, time and quality. Crowley and 
Hancher (1995) applied tendering data to their statistical selection model to evaluate 
selection decisions made in past projects. Both the development and testing of contractor 
selection models conducted thus far has occurred without reference to the theory of 
transaction costs. The relationship between contractor selection models and transaction costs 
should be investigated. The transaction cost model presented in Figures 1 and 2 should be 
tested. If found to be valid, it would serve as a useful basis on which to compare the efficacy 
and usefulness of the different models of contractor selection. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
Coase (1992) acknowledges that his early work was theoretical and advocates empirical 
research to substantiate transaction cost economics theory. Empirical research is emerging to 
support the transaction cost concepts (Lyons 1994, Lyons 1995, Dutta and John 1995). 
Winch’s suggestion that the construction industry market in the United Kingdom is a case of 
market failure is not based upon empirical evidence (Winch 1989) and no work has been 
undertaken to investigate the validity of transaction cost theory in the construction industry. 
The extent to which this theory explains contracting (and also subcontracting) in the 
construction industry should be investigated. Some attempt should be made to quantify 
transaction costs associated with outsourcing construction work.  
The contractor selection literature does not address the issue of the cost of implementing 
contractor selection procedures or the cost-effectiveness of these procedures. Most contractor 
selection models reviewed have not been implemented and rigorously evaluated. Contractor 
selection methods should be empirically tested. The cost of employing different selection 
methods should be identified and weighed against their effectiveness in reducing the ex-post 
costs of market transactions.  
CONCLUSIONS  
Contractor selection models may best be understood in the broader context of the business 
economics literature.  The theory of transaction cost economics dictates that the decision to 
outsource production is based upon the relative costs associated with in-house production and 
outsourcing.  The theory holds that firms will seek to economise on transaction costs. If the 
reason for outsourcing construction work can be explained by transaction cost economic 
theory, then clients should consider the impact of contractor selection on the costs of market 
transactions. 
Within the construction field, many theorists have developed models for selecting suitable 
contractors.  These models vary in their degree of complexity and objectivity. Multi-
parameter contractor selection models offer the best scope for reduction of transaction costs 
because they address a broader range of sources of opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty 
than do comparative bid evaluation models. However, there is a need to develop and validate 
quantitative methods of evaluating performance in all of the parameters of such models. 
Contractor selection systems should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. The costs of having 
no system, such as losses incurred through poor quality, time overruns and claims, should be 
considered as a trade-off against evaluation and administrative costs. While it is theoretically 
possible to gather perfect information on all prospective tenderers for the purpose of making 
the best contractor selection decision, the cost of doing this is prohibitive. If transaction costs 
are regarded as arising primarily from information impactedness, the optimum information 
collection, analysis and evaluation system should be sought to economise on these costs.  
Empirical research is required to evaluate the impact of contractor selection methods on 
transaction costs. The results of such analysis may find that contractor selection systems 
increase the ex-ante costs of transactions but are offset by reductions in monitoring 
requirements, claims and/or litigation costs. 
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